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ABSTRACT ³Cloud computing´ and ³Big Data´ are amongst the most hyped-up terms and 
buzzwords of the moment. After decades in which individuals and companies used to host 
their data and applications using their own IT infrastructure, the world has seen the stunning 
transformation of the Internet. Major shifts occurred when these infrastructures began to be 
outsourced to public Cloud providers to match commercial expectations. Storing, sharing and 
transferring data and databases over the Internet is convenient, yet legal risks cannot be 
 1 
eliminated.1 Legal risk is a fast growing area of research and covers various aspects of law. 
Current studies and research on Cloud computing legal risk assessment have been, however, 
limited in scope and focused mainly on security and privacy aspects. 2  There is little 
systematic research on the risks, threats and impact of the legal issues inherent to database 
rights3 DQG ³RZQHUVKLS´ ULJKWV RI GDWD Database rights seem to be outdated and there is a 
significant gap in the scientific literature when it comes to the understanding of how to apply 
its provisions in the Big Data era. This means that we need a whole new framework for 
understanding, protecting and sharing data in the Cloud. The scheme we propose in this 
chapter is based on a risk assessment brokering framework that works side by side with 
service level agreements (SLAs). This proposed framework will provide better control for 
Cloud users and will go a long way to increase confidence and reinforce trust in Cloud 
computing transactions. 
 
Keywords Cloud Computing, Big Data, Service Level Agreements (SLA), Cloud Brokers, 
Legal Risks, Mutual Trust. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Before embarking on the generally known caveats regarding legal risks, we would like to 
point out what Claudio Ciborra, an information theorist, has explained in his writings on 
information systems and risk management. 4  ,Q ZKDW KH FDOOHG WKH ³GXDOLW\ RI ULVN´ 5  he 
reminds us ³OLIH ULVNDQG WHFKQRORJ\DUHJHWWLQJPRUH LQWLPDWH WKDQHYHU«´.6 According to 
Ciborra, it is not just that our society is becoming increasingly dependent on mobile phones 
and computers as the primary means of communication; it is not about business transactions 
processed through electronic networks; it is not even about jobs being fully automated; or 
human reasoning being replaced by human-like artificial intelligence that emulates the 
 
1
 See, e.g., Disselkamp (2013), Chapter 8 with further references. 
2
 See, e.g., Peng, Dutta and Choudhary, (2014), p. 134. 
3
 See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection 
of databases. 
4
 Gutwirth and Hildebrandt (2010), p. 33. 
5
 For details, see Ciborra (2005). 
6
 Ciborra (2007), p. 27. 
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decision-making of human experts7. Looking ahead and reflecting on the next generation of 
information communication technology (ICT) platforms and risk management, the challenge 
is that ³RXUOLIHSURMHFWEHFRPHVVLPXOWDQHRXVO\FRQGLWLRQHGFRQVWUDLQHGRUHQDEOHGE\Grid 
technologies. The technology is already there, albeit in an indirect anGKLGGHQIRUP«´.8  
Ciborra wrote the above lines more than ten years ago and Grid technologies evolved into 
different models.9 As a matter of fact, Cloud computing is a kind of Grid computing, which 
focuses on the quality of service (QoS) and reliability problems.10 The Cloud differs from the 
Grid essentially in the implementation details.11 According to Ciborra, change and innovation 
brings the emergence of new risks, however, his vision goes beyond to suggest that risks are 
often the source of innovation12 and new order.13 As such, risk is not, in itself, a bad thing; 
rather, it is essential for accelerating progress.14  
The aim of this chapter is to widen the lens through which we view risk and analyze 
particular kinds of legal risk connected to the design and deployment of Grid and Cloud 
computing infrastructures in brokerage scenarios.15 This chapter presents an SLA brokering 
framework including innovative risk-aware assessment techniques, which facilitates the 
clarification of database DQG³RZQHUVKLS´rights of data and evaluates the probability of SLA 
failure. We use the web service agreement specification (WS-Agreement)16 as a template and 
extend prior work on risk metrics from the OPTIMIS project17 to facilitate SLA creation 
between service consumers and providers within typical Cloud brokerage scenarios. However, 
since the WS-Agreement allows for an automated mechanism between only two parties and 
does not cover the use of an intermediary within the agreement process, we use the specific 
 
7
 For details about artificial intelligence (AI) and expert systems, see e.g., Jackson (1998). 
8
 Ciborra (2007), p. 27. 
9
 For details about the evolution of Grid infrastructure technologies, see e.g., Jones and Bird (2013), pp. 160 et 
seq.  
10
 Kasemsap and Sunandha (2015), p. 33. 
11
 Teng and Magoules (2010), p. 126. 
12
 Shantz (2005), p. 511. 
13
 Ciborra (2009), p. 78. 
14
 Drissi, Houmani and Medromi (2013), p. 143. 
15
 See, e.g., Gourlay, Djemame and Padgett (2008), pp. 437-443. 
16
 See Andrieux et al. (2007); See also, Gourlay, Djemame and Padgett (2008), p. 438. More specifically, for 
negotiating and creating SLAs, we use the WSAG4J framework developed at Fraunhofer Institute SCAI. The 
WSAG4J is basically a tool that helps you to create and manage SLAs in distributed systems and has been fully 
implemented as part of the Open Grid Forum (OGF) WS-Agreement standard. For details, see https://packcs-
e0.scai.fraunhofer.de/wsag4j/ accessed 10 October 2016. 
17
 Optimized Infrastructure Services (OPTIMIS) was a EU funded project within the 7th Framework Program 
under contract ICT-257115. The project developed an open source toolkit designed to help Cloud service 
providers to build and run applications in the Cloud. New features that include the clarification of database rights 
DQG³RZQHUVKLS´ULJKts of data have been implemented. The toolkit has been integrated into the Open Nebula 
Ecosystem and the Infrastructure as a Service Cloud computing project Open Stack. 
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work carried out in the AssessGrid project18 that includes a brokerage mechanism and pays 
considerable attention to addressing a risk assessment.19 
SLAs are facilitators for increasing the commercial uptake of Cloud computing services. 
They provide clear-cut rules concerning the expectations and obligations between service 
consumers and providers.20  However, current frameworks fail to provide flexibility21  and 
there is no global standard that clarifies database rights DQGPRUHJHQHUDOO\³RZQHUVKLS´ULJKWV
of data. Therefore, it is always advisable to thoroughly check Cloud SLAs before being 
legally bound by the terms of contracts. Furthermore, without the ability to evaluate the 
probability that a SLA might fail, market growth will be limited, since neither party will be 
willing to agree. By introducing a database DQG³RZQHUVKLS´rights risk assessment alongside 
automated SLA creation and negotiation processes, end-users can uncover high-risk areas to 
attenuate such risks, and eliminate those Cloud providers that will not promote their needs. 
This chapter is divided into 10 sections. Section 2 briefly reviews the extant literature with 
regard to risk assessment in the Cloud. It also explains the motivation and justification for 
deepening and expanding research into other areas of law such as database rights and 
³RZQHUVKLS´ULJKWVRIGDWD. Section 3 is concerned with the methodology used for this study, 
namely a risk-based approach through the whole service life cycle. Section 4 presents an 
overview of the legal risks involved and how a risk mitigation strategy will enhance legal 
interoperability. Section 5 delves into detail concerning database DQG³RZQHUVKLS´ rights of 
data, focusing on the three key themes that create risk in Cloud computing and Big Data 
projects. Section 6 begins by offering a glimpse of the main actors involved. Then it goes on 
to explain the two general use cases considered. Finally, it explains the brokering mechanism 
and risk assessment techniques using WS-Agreement, which facilitates the creation of risk-
aware SLAs between end-users and Cloud providers. Section 7, presents the risk inventory 
within the system architecture design. It includes an updated and customized risk inventory 
focused on the legal areas considered to present the higher risks and constrains. Section 8 
explains step-by-step the different stages of the risk assessment process in Cloud brokerage 
scenarios. In Section 9 a hypothetical scenario is considered to showcase how risk assessment 
can be effectively applied in real cases. Finally, Section 10 concludes. 
 
18
 The Advanced Risk Assessment and Management for Trustable Grids project (AssessGrid), was founded by 
the EU Commission under the FP6 IST framework (contract no. 031772). 
19
 Padgett et al. (2009). 
20
 Djemame et al. (2011b), p. 1558. 
21
 See, e.g., Kirkham et al. (2012), p. 1063. 
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2 Risk Assessment: Literature Review, Motivation and Justification 
 
As the realization of Cloud-based services and infrastructures advance22  from one single 
private Cloud infrastructure, towards more complex migrations in dynamic federated 
scenarios consisting of several coexisting public or hybrid Clouds, there are increasing high 
level concerns. These concerns include issues of risk, trust and legal considerations that 
establish solid foundations for the non-functional requirements23 of the ecosystem. Cloud 
migrations have reached a high level of development, yet the management of Cloud services 
entails a loss of control over the data being processed. This also impairs the trustworthiness in 
Cloud computing technology because end-users are not entirely confident in using the 
Cloud.24 
There are many legal risks involved that have been magnified by the Big Data movement 
to the Cloud.25 The American Heritage dictionary defines risk as ³WKHSRVVLELOLW\RIVXIIHULQJ
KDUP RU ORVV GDQJHU´ ³$ IDFWRU WKLQJ HOHPHQW RU FRXUVH LQYROYLQJ XQFHUWain danger; a 
KD]DUG´.26 Similarly, the Black's Law Dictionary defines risk as ³WKHXQFHUWDLQW\RID UHVXOW
Happening or loss; the chance of injury, damage or loss; esp., the existence and extent of the 
SRVVLELOLW\RIKDUP´.27 Therefore, the term risk can be loosely described as exposing oneself 
to an activity or event that can lead to the possibility of damage, harm or loss.  
Risk assessment is fundamental for widespread commercial adoption, and risk 
management tools need to be integrated into the emerging Cloud paradigm.28 While a variety 
of definitions of the term ³risk management´ have been suggested, in this work we adopt the 
definition given by the International Standards Organization (ISO) as follows: ³a coordinated 
set of activities and methods that are used to direct an organization and to control the many 
risks that can affect its ability to achieve objectives´.29 This definition is close to the Black¶s 
Law Dictionary definition that refers to risk management as: ³the activity of identifying, 
 
22
 See Mahmood (ed) (2014). 
23
 Note: Non-functional requirements present a systematic approach that provides quality to the software system. 
They define the criteria used in the system operation, which is specified in the system architecture. For a 
comprehensive explanation of non-functional requirements see, e.g., Chung et al. (2000); Chung and Sampaio 
Do Prado Leite (2009). 
24
 Li and Singh (2014), p. 670. 
25
 Note: ³&ORXGV DUH D ODUJH SRRO RI HDVLO\ XVDEOH DQG DFFHVVLEOH YLUWXDOL]HG UHVRXUFHV VXFK DV KDUGZDUH
development platforms and/or services). These resources can be dynamically reconfigured to adjust to a variable 
load (scale), allowing also for optimum resource utilization. This pool of resources is typically exploited by a 
pay-per-use model in which guarantees are offered by WKH,QIUDVWUXFWXUH3URYLGHUE\PHDQVRIFXVWRPL]HG6/$V´ 
See Vaquero et al. (2009), pp. 50-55; See also Smith (2009). The above definition is very useful because it also 
LQWURGXFHVD³FXVWRPL]HG6/$´ZKLFKLVH[SORUHGLQJUHDWHUGHWDLOLQWKLVFKDSWHU 
26
 For this term see American Heritage Dictionary. 
27
 Garner (2014), p. 1524. 
28
 See, e.g., Gourlay, Djemame and Padgett (2009), p. 36. 
29
 Plain English ISO 31000:2009. 
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estimating and evaluating the probability of harm associated with an activity and determining 
an acceptable level of risk´ 30  The underlying concepts of risk assessment and risk 
management aim to improve the confidence level between a provider and end-user to sign a 
SLA.31 
Risk assessment must be introduced proactively into the SLA framework to allow the end 
users and Cloud providers to automatically recognize critical points of failure (PoF), and to 
propose corrective actions that would reduce the risks in specific points of the contract in 
order to avoid soaring transaction costs and preventing future controversies. This 
precautionary approach is meant to fill in the gaps in the current SLA frameworks, and to 
imbue a risk management culture among Cloud providers.32 
Despite the fact that many generic risk management assessment standards exist today such 
as the ISO 31000:2009,33 one major difficulty that might arise in the implementation of this 
requirement is the lack of a standard risk assessment method for database rights and 
³RZQHUVKLS´ULJKWVRIGDWD. There are several risks and significant effort has been devoted to 
other areas of law such as privacy, data protection and data security.34 For example the ISO 
22307:2008 35  privacy impact assessment (PIA), 36  for financial services and banking 
management, the ISO/IEC WD 29134 PIA methodology,37 which is expected by 2016, the 
ISO/IEC 29101:2013 for information technology security techniques and privacy architecture 
framework38 and the ISO/IEC NP 19086-4 for Cloud computing SLA framework still under 
development.39 
The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) released at the end of 
2012 the updated version of its 2009 Cloud security risk assessment. The risks are classified 
into three categories: a) Policy and Organizational, b) Technical, and c) Legal. It contains a 
 
30
 Garner (ed) (2014), p. 1525. 
31
 Sangrasi, Djemame and Jokhio (2012), pp. 445-452.  
32
 See, e.g., Nwankwo (2014). 
33
 Note: ISO 31000:2009 risk management standard sets out the principles and guidelines on risk management 
that can be applied to any type of risk in any field of industry or sector. 
34
 Cattedu and Hogben (eds) (2009). 
35
 Note: ISO 22307:2008 is a privacy impact assessment for financial services and banking management tools. It 
recognizes the importance to mitigate risks associated to consumer data utilizing automated and networked 
systems. 
36
 See, e.g., generally, Corrales (2012); Wright and De Hert (eds) (2012). 
37 For details, see http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=62289 
Accessed 10 April 2016. 
38
 ISO/IEC 29101:2013 Information Technology - Security Techniques - Privacy Architecture Framework.  
For details, see 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=45124&commid=45306 
Accessed 10 October 2016; See also Nwankwo (2014). 
39
 ISO/IEC NP 19086-4 Information Technology - Cloud Computing - Service Level Agreement (SLA) 
framework and technology - Part 4 Security and Privacy. For details, see  
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=68242 Accessed  10 October 
2016; See also Nwankwo S (2014). 
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list of 23 risks. One of these risks refers to intellectual property issues, which is a good 
indicator that the perceptions of associated risks of Cloud computing has put intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) under the radar. However, this is described, in our view, too broadly 
and focuses mainly on the copyrights of original work such as new applications, software, 
etc., while other aspects of IPRs such as database rights are not mentioned. As with all the 
IPRs described in the ENISA recommendations, database rights and other issues related to 
³RZQHUVKLS´ ULJKWVRIGDWD must be clarified by the adequate contractual clauses and within 
the service manifest of the SLA otherwise this might be at risk. ENISA has played a crucial 
role in providing stakeholders an overview of the main risks involved in Cloud computing and 
there is a second review round envisaged by the group of experts set up by ENISA where 
legal aspects will be revised in more detail as this was excluded from the first round.40 
Until now, no systematic investigation has adequately explained database rights and 
³RZQHUVKLS´ ULJKWV RI GDWD with consideration being given to the Cloud and Big Data 
phenomenon. In this regard, the present study is the first to undertake a specific risk analysis 
in this domain and aims to contribute to this growing area of research. Understanding the link 
between Big Data, database rights DQG³RZQHUVKLS´ULJKWVRIdata, will help to reduce the legal 
uncertainties and risks involved in Cloud transactions. Thus, the broadening of the scope of 
the risk assessment methods followed hitherto is accordingly designed and advocated in order 
to establish priorities and make strategic choices of Cloud providers a global reality. 
Incorporating risk assessment techniques in Cloud brokerage scenarios and including 
database rights and ³RZQHUVKLS´ULJKWVRIGDWDduring SLA negotiations and service operation, 
will aid the decision-making process regarding contractual agreements. There is a current lack 
of confidence and trust in terms of the uncertainties involved with the SLA level of quality.41 
This is one of the most important barriers to the adoption of Cloud computing. In order to 
improve confidence and create more trust in Cloud transactions, it is necessary to improve 
control over the resources available. The design of Cloud architecture related to application 
deployment seems to be the best route to achieve this. This will also create more optimized 
and transparent resources.42  
It is important to bear in mind that it is not possible to reduce all the risks down to zero. 
Nevertheless, mitigation strategies may at least increase the confidence of end-users and lead 
to a reliable productivity and cost-effective solution for Cloud service providers. In this 
research confidence is defined as ³the expectation of a successful fulfillment of SLA agreed 
 
40
 Dupré and Haeberlen (eds) (2012). 
41
 Djemame et al. (2011a), p. 119. 
42
 See, e.g., Kirkham et al. (2013), p. 7. 
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between a Cloud service consumer and a Cloud service provider´,43 and the notion of cost-
effective and reliable productivity as a ³providers capability of fulfilling an SLA through the 
entire lifecycle of the service provision and at the same time realizing its own business level 
objectives´. In other words, capitalizing and making a certain amount of profit, while 
optimizing the efficacy of infrastructure provider resources.44 
Based on the framework of the OPTIMIS45 and AssessGrid software toolkits, as a basic 
risk factor mechanism, the main contributions of this research are the design and effective 
implementation of a risk assessment framework tailored to database rights DQG³RZQHUVKLS´
rights of data with an eye towards Big Data and other future similar movements. This can be 
efficiently implemented into other high-level Cloud management and control software 
systems for both service providers and infrastructure providers. Although a specific risk 
assessment is the main focus of this chapter, we also consider the decision-making process of 
how to implement corresponding mitigation strategies that may involve other high level 
considerations such as cost-efficiency and trust.46 
 
3 Risk Assessment Methodology 
 
 
Risk analysis can be examined at various stages of Cloud interactions. Each of the actors 
involved in the Cloud will have their own concerns and points of view towards others in terms 
of trust, risks and legal issues.47 They might have specific legal demands that need to be taken 
into consideration. For example, how to reconcile the ³ownership´ of data that may accrue 
from the use of Cloud computing technology? New data can be potentially created out of the 
data derived from the usage of various tools such data mining, analytics, AI, etc. The concept 
of ³ownership´ in this context implies that the owner can control how the data will be 
regulated.48 Events like this and their impact need to be assessed in order to compute an 
overall probability of SLA violation, which requires a detailed analysis. This assessment will 
also depend on the Cloud deployment scenario - bursting, federated, hybrid, etc.49 In this 
research we will consider a Cloud brokerage scenario since the broker can participate as an 
intermediary in any of these scenarios.  
 
43
 Djemame et al. (2011a), p. 119. 
44
 Djemame et al. (2011a), p. 119. 
45
 For details, see Ferrer et al. (2011), pp. 67-77. 
46
 Djemame et al. (2011a), p. 119. 
47
 Khan et al. (2012), p. 122. 
48
 Djemame et al. (2012), p. 3.. 
49
 Khan et al. (2012), p. 122. 
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These legal concerns can also be refined considering the different stages of the Cloud 
lifecycle as follows: (a) the service deployment stage for initial placement of services on 
Cloud providers taking into account the legal issues as a gauge for Cloud provider selection, 
and; (b) the service operation, where Cloud resources and databases are managed by the 
Cloud provider for the attainment of all the service-level objectives (SLO), including the legal 
ones. During these two stages, legal risks need to be continuously and systematically 
monitored in order to avert any additional transaction costs to be incurred to the end-users and 
Cloud providers. 50  Figure 1 below describes the risk assessment steps during service 
deployment and service operation. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Risk assessment life cycle during service deployment and operation 
 
A number of stages have been identified as a process with the aim of performing a 
complete risk assessment on Clouds. Each iteration is used to parse in real time, a core risk 
assessment and helps us to better understand the process. The constituent parts of this 
approach and their relationships are further explained below.51 
3.1 High Level Analysis of the System 
 
A primary high-level analysis of the different deployment scenarios aids identifying the 
actions and assets involved at different stages of the risk assessment process. This helps to 
effectively identify the vulnerable parts of each asset and how they can change through time. 
As a general rule, legal concerns need to be assessed before the service deployment phase if 
the SLA demands specific expectations to be met. In the service operation phase, the legal 
issues involved are constantly monitored throughout the service execution.52 
 
50
 Khan et al. (2012), p. 122. 
51
 Kahn et al. (2012), p. 122. 
52
 Kahn et al. (2012), p. 122. 
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3.2 Identifying the Assets Involved 
 
There are various assets that need to be protected from specific threats during service 
deployment and operation phases. From a legal perspective we refer here to data, databases 
and the terms specified in the SLA.53  
3.3 Identifying the Threats in Each Cloud Deployment Scenario 
 
The risk assessment model adopts a systemic approach by which threats and vulnerabilities 
can be identified. The risk analysis methodology is linked to a threat and vulnerability 
assessment tool. This systemic approach is particularly helpful because it contains a threat 
model ensuring synergies with distributed systems and software in general. This model has 
been adapted to Cloud applications using the CORAS54 risk modeling language technique, 
which is an open-source risk-modeling tool.55 
 
4 Embracing Legal Risks and Enhancing Legal Interoperability 
 
Richard Susskind, in his book The Future of Law, under the sub-heading: ³From legal 
problem solving to legal risk management´, anticipated a paradigm shift in the approach to 
legal problems. While solving legal problems will not disappear in the future, they will be 
substantially mitigated with proactive legal risk management tools and services that will pre-
empt the conventional reactive legal method.56 There is an increasing interest in the adoption 
of risk management methods borrowed from other disciplines that can be effectively adapted 
to use in the legal domain.57 Therefore, the proposed software-based risk assessment tools 
seem a reasonable preventive route for amending the legislative gaps and finding a solution 
 
53
 Kahn et al. (2012), p. 122. 
54
 See, e.g., Vraalsen et al. (2005), pp. 45-60. 
55
 Kahn et al. (2012), p. 123; Djemame et al. (2012), p. 12. 
56
 Note: According to Susskind: :KLOH OHJDO SUREOHP VROYLQJ ZLOO QRW EH HOLPLQDWHG LQ WRPRUURZ¶V OHJDO
paradigm, it will nonetheless diminish markedly in significance. The emphasis will shift towards legal risk 
management supported by proactive facilities, which will be available in the form of legal information services 
and procedures. As citizens learn to seek legal guidance more regularly and far earlier than in the past, many 
potential legal difficulties will be dissolved before needing to be resolved. Where legal problems of today are 
often symptomatic of delayed legal input, earlier consultation should result in users understanding and 
identifying their risks and controlling them before any questions of escalation." See Susskind (1998), p. 290. 
57
 For details, see e.g., Legal Risk Management 
http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/about/organization/nrccl/research-areas/ongoing-research/legal-risk-
management.html#ref1 Accessed 10 October 2016. 
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for the many shortcomings of the rigid and unrealistic constraints of traditional black-letter 
laws.58 
Preliminary work on legal risk management was undertaken as an approach to providing 
legal services in various areas of the IT industry and this continues to be an active area of 
research. However, these generic methods have not reached a high level of sophistication and 
have not been fully implemented yet.59 Current software process optimized models do not 
properly address the legal implications for each phase of the software development lifecycle. 
The lack of systematic and organized standards in this domain provides only scattered 
references to legal aspects. This means that legal risks are managed reactively instead of 
proactively before damage or loss occurs.  
Drawing on software projects, Rejas-Muslera et al., presented a significant analysis and 
discussion on the subject. The authors identified that legal audits are closely related to 
planning activities. According to Muslera et al., legal activities and measures must be planned 
in advance and invoked as time goes by across the entire lifecycle of the product or project in 
order to avoid or reduce negative legal impacts on the achieved objectives. Despite their study 
covers many aspects of law, including copyright, registration and users rights, data protection, 
trading standards, etc.,60 the core interest of the present research lies in the risks associated 
with managing databases.  
The main goal is not to deny these risks and their overall implications but to create a smart 
strategy than can deal with this trade-off. In the following sections and subsections, we 
discuss these legal aspects in the context of Big Data and Cloud computing. Legal issues are 
present at each phase of the whole outsourcing life cycle of a Cloud service. Figure 2 below 
shows a graphic depiction of the overall model from a high level perspective: 
 
                
 
Figure 2:  Legal issues and service life-cycle stages 
 
58
 Wahlgren (2007), p. 91; See also Wintgens and Thion (2007), Introduction. 
59
 Burnett (2005), pp. 61-67. 
60
 Rejas-Muslera, Cuadrado-Gallego and Rodriguez (2007), pp. 118-124. 
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In the initial contractual agreement stage, the end-user may specify legal clauses with 
regard to certain service requirements and how such databases must be handled. While large 
companies and institutions may have more resources to bargain and negotiate specific 
contractual clauses, the standard nature of the SLAs do not allow much room for single users 
and SMEs to negotiate the contract. 61  However, an XML automated schema 62  has been 
specifically crafted to provide more flexibility for smaller companies and individuals so they 
can clarify database rights DQG ³RZQHUVKLS´ ULJKWV RI GDWD and all parties involved can be 
better off. Nevertheless, the point to bear in mind for the moment is that notwithstanding the 
negotiation capabilities of end-users, these contracts are legally binding. The Cloud provider 
must fulfill all the requirements and ensure that all clauses will conform to legal rules before 
deploying the service. Otherwise it will be at risk of facing liability issues should there be any 
breach of the contract. Therefore, monitoring strategies of legal risks should be present 
throughout the operation phase.63 
This framework will improve the legal interoperability among providers on a global scale. 
According to the GEO Data Sharing Task Force, legal interoperability among multiple 
datasets from different sources occurs when: ³the legal rights, terms, and conditions of 
databases from two or more sources are compatible and the data may be combined by any 
user without compromising the legal rights of any of the data sources used.64 This definition is 
important for what it includes as the following conditions:65 
a) The conditions to use data are clear and readily determinable for each dataset,66 
b) The legal conditions granted to use each dataset permits the creation and use of 
³FRPELQHGDQGGHULYDWLYHSURGXFWV´67 and; 
c) End-users may lawfully get access and use each dataset without seeking permission 
from data creators.68 
 
61
 Bradshaw, Millard and Walden (2010). 
62
 Note: XML is a markup language standard that aims to define a format that is both human and machine 
understandable. Thus humans based on a template model may edit it, and the produced created instance can be 
processed by according software, following a relevant decision logic. For example, the template model dictates 
the available fields, the user selects the according values, and then the relevant software may retrieve the XML-
EDVHGSURYLGHUGHVFULSWLRQVDQGILOWHUWKHPEDVHGRQWKHXVHU¶VUHTXLUHPHQWV7KH XML Description Schema is 
available at: http://www.optimis-project.eu/content/xml-description-schema-improvement Accessed 10 October 
2016. For details about the XML schema see previous chapter.  
63
 Batré et al. (2007), p. 193. 
64
 For details, see Draft White Paper on Legal Options for the Exchange of Data through the GEOSS Data-
CORE. Group on Earth Observations. 
65
 White Paper, Mechanisms to Share Data as Part of GEOSS Data-CORE, p. 3. 
66
 White Paper, Mechanisms to Share Data as Part of GEOSS Data-CORE, p. 3. 
67
 White Paper, Mechanisms to Share Data as Part of GEOSS Data-CORE, p. 3. 
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Legal interoperability is a bottleneck in Cloud computing transactions, where many 
resources are available and data is used, re-combined and then derivative data is re-
disseminated. This might also prove a great hindrance to public research. The protectionist 
mentality underlying database rights is, however, very dangerous because it automatically 
frames access to data as a threat. Within this mindset, there is a risk of databases being locked 
in. As we shall see soon, the database righst (sui generis right) casts serious problems on the 
Big Data movement, which does not understands the protection of databases in the same way 
as the protectionist mentality. The quest for Big Data invites the researcher or entrepeneur to a 
place where information can lead to innovation and productivity. There should be an equitable 
trade-off between the protection of databases and access to data that is in the public domain. 
The term public domain has come to be used to refer to ³information that is: a) not subject 
to copyright or related rights (including database rights), and; b) not subject to conditions on 
reuse imposed by other means´.69 This approach could raise and promote social welfare and 
the goals intended by the Big Data movement by making datasets available to end-users. In a 
free market economy individuals should be allowed to obtain unrestricted use and re-
dissemination of data. This market competition process may help to correct behavioral market 
problems. The public domain status may be created formally through laws and policies that 
exempt certain categories of data and information from database protection. However, this 
could also be achieved through contractual private agreements among parties.70 
For many scholars, the database right is considered unsuccessful. The detractors of the EU 
Database Directive have often expressed the criticism that this could be raising hurdles to 
innovation and free development in various areas of industry.71 Another objection to database 
rights is that this may lock up data and information, which can negatively affect the research 
and academic community that rely on the availability of data and information to carry on their 
business or research.72 According to Kingston, the EU Database Directive has been influenced 
by publisher lobbying, which confers them the potential to attain a continuous monopoly on 
data.73 Coining the words of Reichman and Samuelson, the database right is ³RQHRIWKHOHDVW
 
68
 White Paper, Mechanisms to Share Data as Part of GEOSS Data-CORE, p. 3. 
69
 Summary White Paper, Legal Options for the Exchange of Data through the GEOSS Data-CORE, p. 2. 
70
 Summary White Paper, Legal Options for the Exchange of Data through the GEOSS Data-CORE, p. 19. 
71
 Sundara Rajan (2011), p. 286. 
72
 For the extensive case law on this topic see, e.g., Fixtures Marketing Ltd. v Oy Veikkaus AB, ECJ ± Case C-
46/02, 9 November 2004 (Finland); Fixtures Marketing Ltd. v Organismos Prognostikon Agonon Podosfairou 
[the OPAP case], ECJ-&DVHီ&-444/02, 9 November 2004 (Greece); Fixtures Marketing Ltd. v Svenska Spel 
AB, ECJ ± Case C- 338/02, 9 November 2004 (Sweden); The British Horseracing Board Ltd and Others v 
William Hill Organization Ltd., [the BHB case], ECJ, Case C-203/02, 9 November 2004 (United Kingdom). 
73
 See Kingston (2010), p. 112. Notably, statistics have shown that about 50% of all legal suits have been raised 
by a scarce minority of companies that own telephone directories, sport betting fixtures, concert events, and 
broadcast schedules. See Maurer S (2008), pp. 13-4 ± 13-80. Ironically, what these companies have in common 
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balanced and most potentially anti-competitive intellectual property rights eveU FUHDWHG´.74 
Finally, opponents of these rights argue that this form of protection is too narrow in scope and 
fails to address other relevant issues for the database industry.75 These arguments clearly 
show the negative perception among some scholars, which prompts worries about its potential 
negative effects.  
It is not the purpose of this research to enter into such controversies. Nevertheless, we 
would generally agree with the idea that database rights could potentially distort the right to 
access information and certain issues of abuse of monopoly could emerge, in particular if one 
look at this problem from a global Cloud computing perspective. We think all these 
arguments are legitimate and that sui generis rights could eventually lock up data to the 
detriment of the scientific and academic community as well as other areas of industry. This 
yields much greater protection to databases, yet with a certain degree of uncertainty that may 
fall foul of prior intellectual property law principles by placing strong exclusive property 
rights on investment instead of creativity and innovation. Still, we find it possible to argue for 
a more balanced approach, which is more flexible and less objectionable than database rights. 
In order to respond to the critics of sui generis rights, what we propose is a mechanism that 
follows the core principles and guidelines of best practices through which legal 
interoperability, and, a right balance between the transferability of conventional databases and 
the availability of Big Data can be achieved. 
 
5 Conventional Databases vs. Big Data: Striking the Right Balance 
 
As seen above, the sui generis right is a well-established IPR protected under the umbrella of 
the EU Database Directive. This right stems from the necessity to foster the database industry 
in the EU in a time where databases needed an extra scope of protection.76 However, this right 
caused some concerns and uproar among legal experts, mainly due to its failure to come to 
terms with new technological advances of the Internet and with the onset of Cloud computing 
 
is that they do not collect data from the outside world. They create it through events organized by them. This sort 
of data is known aV³V\QWKHWLFGDWD´6HH0DXUHU+XJHQKROW]DQG2QVUXG(2001), pp. 789-790. 
74
 Bently and Sherman (2009), pp. 310-311. 
75
 DG Internal Market and Services Working Paper, First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal 
Protection of Databases, p. 4. 
76
 Note: The concept of protecting databases with only copyright changed radically right after a series of case 
laws rejecting copyright protection such as the Van Daele v Romme ruling in the Netherlands, where Van Daele 
could not protect the copying of its dictionary because of lacking the threshold of originality, and; the Feist 
Publications v Rural Telephone Service Co. [Feist case] judgment in the US, where the courts decided not to 
grant copyright protection to a phone directory on the same grounds. See Van Dale Lexicografie B.V. v Rudolf 
Jan Romme, Hoge Raad, Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 4 January 1991, NG 1991, 608, (The Netherlands); 
Feist Publications v Rural Telephone Service Co. 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (United States).   
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services along with the Big Data movement, which may undermine and hamper scientific and 
research activities.  
The Database Directive is still clinging to old fashioned ideas of conventional databases 
that have a fixed structure on which one accumulates and stores data. Another defining factor 
is the ubiquitous nature of the Cloud that often obscures the physical location of databases. 
The ability of Cloud providers to transfer databases across multiple countries represents the 
problem of dealing with different legal jurisdictions. This situation can collide with the 
legislation of those countries where database rights do not even exist. Therefore, the first 
problem to be addressed in the contracts is that database rights should only be implemented in 
jurisdictions where this right exists and limited to a geographic location due to its territorial 
nature.  
We think that this represents a good starting point. However, if we follow this approach 
only, this debate continues to be stuck in the old paradigm. In view of the immense influence 
of the Big Data phenomenon, the real issue lies elsewhere. If our aim is the empowerment of 
end-users so they can take the initiative and make decisions in the face of the Big Data 
movement, then database rights seem entirely counterproductive. The explosive growth77 and 
breadth of reach of Big Data has expanded so much that it has surpassed the traditional 
logistics of storing, processing, or analyzing data.78 It touches upon almost every corner of the 
digitized world and its benefits have enthralled all aspects of human life.79 
Nevertheless, this great exposure comes along with various risks and opens the door for 
litigation.80 Big data in the Cloud refers not only to the storage and accumulation of large 
amounts of data but also how to organize and label such data in a variety of different and 
useful ways81 (structured, unstructured,82 semi-structured,83 etc.).84 Big data generally slices 
and dices information. This breakdown process implies a systematic reduction of information 
into smaller pieces that can be arranged in a way that will yield new information. This 
includes machine-generated data from automated sensors, nuclear plants, X-ray and scanning 
machines, airplane engines, consumer interaction from businesses, 85  mobiles and social 
media.86 If this information is exploited properly it will revolutionize the decision-making 
 
77
 Majkic (2014), Preface. 
78
 Dean (2014), p. 10. 
79
 Ridley (2015), p. 79. 
80
 Ridley (2015), p. 79. 
81
 See, e.g. generally, Sakr and Gaber (eds) (2014). 
82
 Note: Unstructured data is the subset of information. For example: text mining in the medical field. For details, 
see e.g., Holzinger et al. (2013), p. 13. 
83
 Semi-structured data such as XML. See, e.g. generally, Ishikawa (2015).  
84
 See, e.g. generally, Kitchin (2014). 
85
 Krishnan (2013), p. 5. 
86
 Vashist (2015), p. 1. 
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process - entrusting more on data analysis instead of intuition and experience. This being said, 
individuals and institutions need to consider not only the best means to generate and exploit 
data but also how to protect and manage their data. This raises challenging questions about 
policies and practices that have direct implications on our lives.87 
The vexed question is how to strike the right balance between the transferability of 
conventional databases and the availability of Big Data. This research attempts to answer 
some of these lingering questions and fill a long held gap in the scientific literature. In line 
with the principle of free and open access to data,88 the framework we propose endows end-
users and Cloud providers with a flexible mechanism through the Cloud broker to ensure 
freedom of contract. This interpretation gleaned from the aforementioned principles and ideas 
can best be treated under three headings: 1) Territorial scope of protection, 2) ³Ownership´ 
rights of new data generated by the Big Data movement in the Cloud, and; 3) Lack of 
international legal and contractual standards, as follows: 
 
5.1 Territorial Scope of Protection 
 
This problem relates to the ubiquitous nature of the Cloud and the territorial scope of 
protection of database rights that creates legal hurdles. One of the most contentious provisions 
of the EU Database Directive, which is relevant to our discussion in particular in the context 
of Cloud computing and Big Data, is Article 11 which establishes territorial constraints with 
regard to who may be subject to obtain database rights. In principle, the right extends only to 
makers or rights holders who are nationals or habitual residents of a EU Member State. This is 
further explained in Article 11 (2) that includes companies or firms, which have their 
principal place of business or central administration within the EU.89 This is a controversial 
and anachronistic provision in the context of Cloud computing and Big Data due to its 
essentially pervasive nature. In view of the fact that servers can be located in different 
countries outside of the EU, and that databases can be easily reproduced in virtual machines 
(VM), there is a risk of potential future controversies between the parties involved in Cloud 
computing transactions.  
If a database qualifies for protection, and it is stored on a server, which is within the 
jurisdiction of EU/EEA Member States, then there is no doubt that it will be protected. 
However, the crucial question to determine here is whether the jurisdiction applies to the 
 
87
 Lohr (2015). 
88
 See, e.g. generally, OECD Principles and Guidelines for Access to Research Data from Public Funding (2007).  
89
 Davison (2003), p. 97. 
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place where the database has been created or where the database has been recorded. This 
distinction will fundamentally affect database protection in Cloud transactions, as there are no 
database rights in other countries outside of the EU.90 
Currently, there is not such an automated procedure for checking whether database rights 
are clearly defined and specified so that a broker can ³on the fly´ confirm the legal 
compliance. These checks may include the location of the federated infrastructure provider 
using a location constraint mechanism. If the target infrastructure provider is inside the 
jurisdiction of the EU/EEA Member States then the outsourcing of data and databases may be 
fulfilled with minimal intervention taking into account that database rights exist within the 
jurisdiction of European countries. If the infrastructure provider is located outside the 
boundaries of any of the EU/EEA Member States, and, therefore, outside of the scope of the 
Database Directive, then the federation cannot be performed if these checks are not in place in 
advance.91 
However, Cloud customers can decide to waive their database rights in order to federate 
the databases outside the boundaries of the EU/EEA Member States. As seen earlier, 
databases represent the risk of being potentially ³exported´ overseas to a jurisdiction without 
database rights. Therefore, they should only be implemented in jurisdictions where this right 
exists and limited to a ³geographic location´ due to its territorial nature. For this reason, we 
propose a OHJDO ³glocalizational´ 92  solution that includes an unconditional waiver as an 
alternative for scientific databases and/or for databases transferred across different 
jurisdictions outside the EU/EEA countries. 
 
5.2 ³2ZQHUVKLS´5LJKWVRI1HZ'DWD*HQHUDWHGE\%LJ'DWD 
 
As hinted above, the exponential growth of data, both structured and unstructured, and the 
booming of Big Data trends, have the ability to create new information from the data 
submitted to the Cloud. This newly created data has value for both end-users and Cloud 
providers. This means that some of the provisions enshrined in the EU Database Directive are 
becoming obsolete. Furthermore, there seems to be a lack of international legal standard that 
GHILQHV³RZQHUVKLS´ ULJKWVRIGDWDDFFUXLQJ IURPVFLHQWLILF UHVHDUFKDQG Big Data analyses. 
 
90
 With the exception of Mexico, South Korea and Russia. 
91
 See, e.g., Kousiouris, Vafiadis and Corrales (2013), pp. 61-72. In this work the authors refer mainly to data 
protection issues, however the same principles and ideas underlying the geographic location and data transfers 
could apply to database rights. 
92
 According to Annupan Chander, legal glocalization ³ZRXOGUHTXLUHWKHFUHDtion or distribution of products or 
services intended for a global market but customized to conform to local laws - within the bounds of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´See Chander (2013), pp. 11, 16, 137, 143, 144, 145 and 169. 
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There is some sort of prevailing ³JOREDOQRUP´, where the person or company who collects 
the data³RZQV´LWThis problem seems to bring conflicting arguments between the involved 
parties. Therefore, there is a need for an efficient and automated procedure during the 
negotiation of SLAs in Cloud computing transactions, which aims to establish a clear and 
effective procedure to layout early in the contract who ³owns´ this data and define the 
conditions as to whether data will be shared or not among, for example, Cloud providers and 
end-users, researchers/doctors and patients, etc. 
 
5.3 Lack of International Legal and Contractual Standards 
 
The third problem is the lack of a common international contractual framework to mitigate 
these legal risks. This leads to a lack of interoperability at the global scale that obstructs the 
Cloud computing and Big Data markets from thriving. Cloud customers are facing difficulties 
in choosing the right Cloud provider that best fits their needs. The lack of a structure or frame 
supporting the clarification of such rights creates tension between the stakeholders involved in 
Cloud computing transactions. Customers using Cloud computing services are not longer 
satisfied to deal with these uncertainties post facto. They need clear guidelines at the time 
they enter into a Cloud computing transaction.  
 As a corollary, due to the lack of an efficient and automatic procedure for the clarification 
of database rights and ³ownership´ rights of data in the Cloud, end-users have to cope with 
the uncertainties and intricacies of the decision-making. The current state of the art in the 
Cloud market allows only for a limited category of static and non-negotiable click-through 
SLA (usually ranked as gold, silver, or bronze). The manual selection of Cloud providers in 
order to meet their functional requirements (e.g. storage capabilities, number and size of 
servers, etc.) and non-functional capabilities (e.g. legal) has been perceived as imposing 
transaction costs. End-users must go through the cumbersome procedure of visiting manually 
the websites of Cloud providers to compare their quality of services and legal policies.93 
In short, what we want to achieve is a flexible and automated SLA that includes: a) the 
possibility to keep databases (and as a consequence database rights) within the EU 
jurisdiction.94 This would be the case an end-user does not want to share data and still keeps 
database rights and enjoy the benefits of the EU Directive. If so, databases should stay within 
the EU jurisdiction, b) the possibility to clarify who ³owns´ the processed and derivate data. 
 
93
 See Wu et al. (2013), pp. 235-244. 
94
 Or, for example, in Mexico, South Korea and Russia as these countries have also database rights similar to the 
EU Database Directive. 
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This would be the case of Big Data projects/applications, e.g. using data mining tool 
techniques, statistics, analytics, etc., where there is potentially valuable information for both 
the end-users and Cloud providers. The contract should be able to clarify who ³owns´ this 
new data. This situation is between end-users and providers, or potentially among end-users 
working in the same project e.g. a research project using genetic, geo-data, spatial data, etc. It 
goes without saying that all these legal issues could be clarified via a consortium agreement 
(CA). In a realistic Cloud computing scenario, however, what we need to avoid are manual 
negotiations. Therefore, this capability should be carried out automatically, and c) a waiving 
mechanism, by which end-XVHUVPD\UHOLQTXLVKWKHLUGDWDEDVHULJKWVDQG³RZQHUVKLS´ULJKWV
of data. This would be the case of a Big Data collaborative project where many countries are 
involved.95 This way databases would remain open and everyone could get access and tap into 
it. On the one hand, most research is conducted by joint efforts of public as well as private 
institutions in interdisciplinary and international contexts. On the other, competition in a 
behaviorally imperfect market is inevitable, and the possibility of waiving database rights 
does not mean that competition has to be curtailed. Providing more information and warning 
signals can offer end-users more choices and grant them more control over their data. 
 
6 Risk Assessment Techniques and Typical Actors Involved in Brokering 
WS-Agreements 
 
 
This section focuses on explaining in more detail the brokering mechanism, which facilitates 
the creation of risk-aware SLAs between the typical actors involved in Cloud computing 
transactions. Three actors exist in the architecture of a typical Cloud brokerage scenario: end-
user, broker and provider. An end-user is an individual or a company who wants to use the 
Cloud in order to perform certain task consisting of one or more services. The user must 
explicitly specify the tasks and associated requirements within an SLA template. In the 
preamble of this process, the end-user needs to make informed and risk-aware decisions on 
the SLA quotes. In order to make this risk assessment more practical, we consider two broad 
typical brokerage scenarios that provide ideal use cases. In both situations resources are 
dynamically allocated and redistributed. These scenarios are the following:  
 
a) Broker as Mediator: In this case the broker performs a risk assessment on behalf of 
the end-user in order to find the most suitable Cloud provider and bring the parties 
 
95
 See, e.g., GEOSS-data Core project, p. 11. 
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together. It follows a four-step process: First, the end-user sends an SLA request to the 
broker. Then, the broker forwards the SLA quotes to a pool of suitable Cloud providers. 
Once all the SLA quotes are received from the providers, the broker performs an 
independent risk assessment of each provider. Then, the broker creates a ranked list 
according to their PoF. Finally, the end-user is then free to choose and commit to an SLA 
quote by engaging directly with the selected provider.96 
 
b) Broker as Contractor: In this case the broker takes a more active role and offers its 
own SLA to end-users. The risk assessment works in the same way of the previous 
scenario. However, the main difference here is that the broker takes full responsibility of 
the SLA and performs WKH UROHRI D ³YLUWXDO´ provider. Therefore, an end-user contracts 
directly with a broker instead of with the Cloud provider. The broker agrees to the terms 
and conditions of the SLA between itself and each Cloud provider.97 
 
This brokerage mechanism will be used as a technical framework to include database and 
³RZQHUVKLS´rights of data risk assessment techniques. It is in the best interest of both sides: a) 
end-users: as it increases the selection of Cloud providers by comparing SLA quotes that 
match their expectations, and; b) Cloud providers: as it generates a larger user pool base and 
attempts to reduce deliberation costs in deciding upon which SLA requests to accept. From a 
provider¶s perspective, accepting an SLA implies the potential risk of paying a penalty if such 
commitment cannot be met.98 
It is important to bear in mind the limitations of this framework. The introduction of a 
broker alone will not dissipate all the uncertainties before signing the SLA. Nonetheless, the 
implementation of a risk-aware brokering mechanism provides the means to formally evaluate 
the probability and expected impact of potential adverse events. Without such knowledge end-
users and Cloud providers cannot take the right decisions with regard to costs and benefits. In 
a nutshell: this is a win-win situation that will reduce transaction costs.99 
Nevertheless, the crucial question that remains still is whether the Cloud brokers are 
poised to offer a viable and transparent alternative route for end-users and Cloud providers.100 
To some extent the Cloud broker-enabling technology should improve the available choices 
by providing the means for control and transparency to make effective and proactive data-
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driven decision-making.101 From the perspective of end-users, the broker should be seen as a 
trusted advisor that aids them to make better decisions.102  
For this reason, a relevant aspect of this framework is the implementation of a software 
component - a confidence service; designed to perform an independent and objective 
assessment of the reliability of Cloud providers in relation to the SLA PoF. Cloud providers 
usually run their own risk assessment, however this can be too optimistic and overlook some 
of the important facts that are relevant for end-users. Therefore, the confidence service 
component provides more transparency and additional risk information to enhance the SLA 
decision-making process of end-users.103 
 
7 Risk Inventory Design  
 
Designing a risk inventory depends on the purpose and area in which they are applied. It has 
to be contextualized taking into account all the parties involved. As explained above, in our 
use case scenarios, these actors are end-users, Cloud providers and the broker who can 
acquire different roles (mediator or contractor).104 The risk inventory may also have different 
categories. In the case of the OPTIMIS risk assessor component, there are four broad 
categories i.e. general, technical, policy and legal.105 A risk inventory must be tailored and 
refined to fit a specific purpose. For the implementation of this framework, a set of processes 
has been identified as follows:106 
1. Use cases: determine precisely which use case scenario to focus on: in this case, a 
Cloud brokerage scenario.107 
2. Levels of interaction: establish the areas of interaction in the Cloud. Interactions may 
involve various levels in the Cloud. In this case we consider two levels: a) end-user to 
service provider, and b) service provider to infrastructure provider. Insomuch as 
during each of these levels particular aspects of the SLA needs to be agreed upon and 
its fulfillment monitored.108 
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3. Assets: it is necessary to identify what is the asset being protected. In this case, 
database DQG ³RZQHUVKLS´ ULJKWV (and their characteristics) and SLAs. Risks events 
will be assessed and protected taking into account external or internal dangers 
(risks).109  
4. Incidents/Risk Scenarios: it is necessary to describe any event, condition or a blend 
of both that has the potential to diminish the capacity or availability of an asset. These 
consist of the vulnerabilities and threats these assets may have during service 
operation. This includes the ³adaptive capacity´, which is the specific description of 
the mitigation strategy to be carried out for each risk scenario and its asset.110  
5. Triggering Factor: it is necessary to identify the factors that lead to activate risk. 
Risks may also be dynamic. This means they can change and continually fluctuate 
over time as they are directly exposed to changes in the Cloud ecosystem such as 
regulatory requirements, changes in policies and contractual clauses, transactions, etc. 
The implementation of monitoring strategies may help to mitigate them during Cloud 
service deployment and operation phases.111 
                
 
Figure 3:  Risk Inventory for the Identification of Legal Risks in the Cloud Architecture 
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The risk inventory designed within the scope of the OPTIMIS project has been integrated 
as a rule-based legal risk112 modeling component and an integral part of the risk assessment 
software tool (see Figure 3 above). The risk assessment tool is a ³self-contained independent 
functional model´, which means that it is a completely independent component that enables 
customization and is able to work as a ³plug-in´.113  This allows the addition of specific 
features to the existing software application. In the context of the OPTIMIS toolkit, the risk 
assessment tool has been implemented as two coexisting but independent components as 
follows: a) the service provider risk assessment tool (SPRAT), and; b) the infrastructure 
provider risk assessment tool (IPRAT).114 
 
8 Different Stages of Risk Assessment in Cloud Brokerage Scenarios (CBS) 
 
As explained earlier, in a typical CBS there are three main parties involved. These are, the 
end-users, the broker and the Cloud provider. The Cloud provider could be a service provider 
or an infrastructure provider (i.e. virtual machine (VM) provider). From a service and 
infrastructure provider perspective, data management services are supplied by the broker to 
co-ordinate and provide services or infrastructure in terms of data processing and quality of 
service. Figure 4 below shows the document flow for creating an SLA and the different stages 
where the risk assessment can take place. This procedure takes part during the whole service 
life-span (establishment, deployment and execution phase).115 With a view to making it easier 
for the lay person, this process can be split into five consecutive steps as follows: 
1. At stage number 1, the SLA request is sent to various infrastructure providers (e.g. IP 
A, IP B, and IP C). At this stage the broker wants to know which provider can run a 
service upon end-user's request. Prior to making this contact the broker should be able 
to assess the end-XVHU¶V UHTXLUHPHQWV DQG ³ILOWHU´ IURP LWV OLVW RI LQIUDVWUXFWXUH
providers those that may be able to make an SLA offer. Note that upon receiving an 
SLA request the infrastructure provider can selectively choose to accept it (and 
consequently the SLA needs to be fulfilled at service operation) or reject it.  
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2. At stage number 2, the broker receives a reply from the infrastructure provider in the 
form of an SLA offer. It may happen that the broker will receive several replies from 
different infrastructure providers. In the figure below, the broker receives an SLA 
offer from IP A and IP C. 
3. At stage number 3, the broker filters all the offers received from the infrastructure 
providers who can run the service. At this stage the broker can see which offer is more 
favorable to the end-user, i.e. proceeds with a ranking. 
4. At stage number 4, the broker selects the most suitable infrastructure provider among 
all the SLA offers and contracts with one of them. At this stage the SLA is bound 
between the infrastructure provider and the broker. 
5. At stage number 5, the service is in operation. At this stage, the broker has chosen and 
told the infrastructure provider to run the service.  
                     
Figure 4:  Different Stages of Risk Assessment in CBS 
 
Risk can occur at any time. That is, at stage 1, risk can take place before sending an SLA 
request to the infrastructure provider. In this case, the risk assessment is going to assess the 
risk of dealing with various infrastructure providers. This will work as a kind of ³pre-
assessment´ when the broker is about to choose the provider. After this first screening 
procedure, the broker can then discard the providers that do not comply with the end-user's 
requirements. At stage 3, the broker filters the provider's offer. In this case, the risk assessor 
component can ³look´ inside the shortlisted SLA offers and can assess the risk of accepting 
the SLA. At stage 5, the infrastructure provider is running the service. Therefore, the risk 
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assessor component assesses the risk of the SLA failing during service operation. These are 
all different kinds of risk assessments. In addition, the risk assessment is from both sides as it 
can be run by the broker on behalf of the end-user and by the infrastructure provider. In the 
latter case, the infrastructure provider might have the same questions i.e. what is the risk of 
dealing with this broker? What is the risk of accepting this SLA request? And, finally, what is 
the risk of the SLA failing during service operation?116 
The question arises, what does this all have to do with databases and the ³ownership´ 
rights of data? The reason is that all of the above could be tailored to database rights and 
³ownership´ rights of data. It could be an integral part of the equation, i.e., part of the SLA 
negotiations. A key point of this research is to extend the scope of parameters and the range of 
conditions that can be understood, measured and evaluated. This needs to be included in the 
risk assessor model as an extension to the legal category. Database rights and ³ownership´ 
rights of data can be part of the ³policy´, ³legal´ ³technical´ and ³general´ criteria to be 
considered and evaluated. For instance, what is the risk of dealing with an infrastructure 
provider considering database rights? To answer this question, one may look at different 
criteria that can be assessed quantitatively or qualitatively. These criteria can refer to different 
areas that have been filtered from the ISO standards117 and ENISA guidelines such as: back 
SLA performance, business stability, general security practices, privacy practices, 
certification standards, geographic location of the infrastructure providers, general 
infrastructure practices (e.g. information about back-up, history, machine), etc.118 
A quantitative risk assessment provides a numerical expression of probabilities.119 It is 
based on track records of the broker dealing with the infrastructure provider. It is a reputation-
based mechanism that classifies information based on past SLA performance. A risk level 
numerical estimation can be used to represent the probability of a risk that a specific harm 
will result from the occurrence of a particular event. For example, a 10-point rating scale: 
from 10 times, the infrastructure provider fails 1 time. The score is 9 out of 10.120 Travel 
websites such as Trip Advisor are clear examples of this kind of ranking system. They often 
provide a forum where previous travellers can share their opinions and experiences.121  
The data is analyzed within the inherent reputation engine of the risk assessor model using 
algorithms and statistical analysis. This score is then translated into the risk. The highest score 
represents a high risk and lowest score a very low risk. This forms part of the ³confidence 
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service´ that has been developed as part of the risk assessment model.122 The only downside 
to a quantitative reputation-based risk assessment is when there are no track records, i.e., 
when there is no past-SLA information. In this case, the information has to be garnered from 
scratch. Stages number 1 and 3 in the figure above are relatively easy as they refer to existing 
data, i.e., data that has already been collected.  
Stage number 5 is, however, more difficult to calculate, as this data has to be interpreted 
semantically and needs to be collected when the service is running during service operation. 
At this stage, the approach of any risk assessment must be qualitative. This method is 
conditioned to prior expert knowledge based on non-numeric values.123 This means that the 
information or data that needs to be collected are expressed in verbal form instead of numbers 
or quantities as in the case of the quantitative method.124 Therefore, the risk inventory must be 
extended to VXSSRUWGDWDEDVHULJKWVDQG³RZQHUVKLS´ULJKWVRIGDWDHLWKHUDVDQHZFDWHJRU\RU
as part of the legal risk criteria. The qualitative risk assessment model needs data to be 
monitored based on the vulnerabilities and threats attached to it. This becomes one more 
component at the moment of assessing the overall risk of the SLA failing at the service 
operation phase (e.g. the risk of a computer system or VM failing in cases of natural disasters 
such as earthquakes, floods, etc.).125  
 
9 Use Case Scenario: Examples 
 
In this section a hypothetical scenario is considered to showcase how the risk assessment can 
be effectively applied in real cases with an emphasis on the different threats and 
vulnerabilities identified as in the risk assessment process. 
To address these legal issues, we need to envisage a hypothetical scenario where database 
rights and ³ownership´ rights of data are breached or likely to be breached. For example, if 
the right to access a database has been granted, what are the inherent risks of that happening? 
Or, if database rights have not been granted, what are the results of this happening? In other 
words, we need to identify the specific threats and vulnerabilities related to database rights 
and ³ownership´ rights of data. Note that a threat is ³a potential cause of an unwanted 
incident´,126 which may cause harm to a system or organization,127 whereas a vulnerability is 
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³a weakness, flaw or deficiency that opens for, or may be exploited by, a threat to cause harm 
to or reduce the value of an asset´128, e.g. the database and the right to access it. It is only then 
when the obvious gaps are realized and the risk assessment model acquires its full value, as 
we will have a better understanding of the concrete data that we need to assess, measure and 
monitor in those situations and convert it into a specific risk analysis, risk being ³the 
likelihood of an unwanted incident (an event) and its consequence (impact) for a specific 
DVVHW´. 129 Several consequence descriptors may apply to a single risk. The most 
serious/significant of these should be used to determine the risk exposure rating. The 
likelihood and impact levels are then cross tabulated to give a risk exposure rating. This 
determines whether a risk is categorised as low, medium, high or very high (Table 1).130 
Prioritising of risks that are assigned the same risk exposure rating is achieved by examining 
the strength of the control measures in place for these risks. For example, a ³high´ rated risk 
could have effective control measures in place that cannot be improved upon, whereas a 
³medium´ rated risk may not have any control measures in place, and this is the risk that 
should be prioritised for action. 
 
 
 
Likelihood 
Impact 
Negligible Minor Moderate Major Extreme 
Rare Low Low Low Medium Medium 
Unlikely Low Medium Medium Medium High 
Possible Low Medium Medium High High 
Likely Medium Medium High High Very high 
Almost certain Medium High High Very high Very high 
 
Table 1: Risk Exposure Rating 
 
We focused on a hypothetical scenario targeting a broad sector within the scope of a 
globalized world. This use case scenario refers to a research form that is typically found in 
transnational research such as genetic research projects within clinical trials. In this context, 
the risk assessment model is combined with an adaptive and flexible SLA with a data centric 
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monitoring infrastructure. The main focus is to expand the range of SLAs to cover cross-
border activities similar to the use case depicted below. The outcome is a contribution to 
equip the involved parties with a tool that can offer more choices to satisfy the legal 
requirements in Cloud computing transformations.  
 
9.1 Use Case Scenario: Genetic Research Projects within Clinical Trials 
 
Genetic research projects within clinical trial scenarios frequently collect biological and 
genetic data from patients/participants. This data is then VWRUHG LQDKRVSLWDO¶VGDWDEDVHV IRU
future research purposes. Genetic data is regarded to be unique and very sensitive as it has the 
potential of revealing in the future personal, scientific and medical information of each patient 
including the family members of the data subject.131 For this reason, genetic research projects 
typically handle anonymized data using advanced encryption tools in order to safeguard 
SDWLHQWV¶ SULYDF\ ULJKWV DQG EH LQ FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK GDWD SURWHFWLRQ ODZV 2QFH WKH GDWD KDV
become entirely anonymous, it is ready to be used by the research community. It is not the 
purpose of this chapter to discuss data protection matters; rather this section focuses on 
answering the question: who has the ³ownership´ rights of such data and databases? Or, who 
is allowed to use and get access to such data for scientific research purposes? In other words, 
it is more about the controllability of data and databases. And, to point to some general 
features of the SLA that, in tandem with the risk assessment tool, may help to clarify and 
mitigate some of the uncertainties around these questions. 
For this reason, the role of the broker in this type of use case scenario is very important as 
it can take a fiduciary nature as a trusted third party and audit such compliance. The broker 
can intervene and be in charge of engaging with end-users (in this case the hospitals or 
research institutions) and the Cloud providers. At the same time, some of the brokers may 
correct the complaints or requests of the end-users and serve as a gate away to information 
necessary to clarify and rectify the contractual terms of the SLA. This provides the 
opportunity to expand its assistance as a mere agent considerably beyond the model for what 
has already been established and cover various use case scenarios within an international 
framework. Figures 5 and 6 below illustrate some of the risk assessment features that fall 
within the ³policy´DQG ³legal´ categories as follows: 
 
 
 
131
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 Risk Category: Policy/Legal 
 Asset Identified: Data (³Rwnership´ rights of new data 
generated by Big Data applications) 
 Vulnerability of Asset: Lack of clarification within the SLA 
of who is allowed to use and access the new data generated 
in the Cloud  
 Threat to Asset: SLA 
 Risk Likelihood: Possible 
 Risk Impact: Extreme 
 Resulting Risk Level: Product of risk likelihood and risk 
impact = High 
 Risk Event: Negligence: This risk takes place at steps 
number 1 and 3  (see Figure 4 above). That is, when the 
broker sends the SLA request to various Cloud providers 
and then filters the offers received. In this case the broker 
must choose the provider according to end-XVHU¶VFULWHULD 
 Resulting Risk Mitigation: Include a string field capability 
within the SLA, which allows the inclusion of contractual 
clauses that can clarify who is allowed to use and access 
this data e.g. for scientific research. 
 
Figure 5: Example of Policy/Legal Category 
 
 
 Risk Category: Legal 
 Asset Identified: Databases 
 Vulnerability of Asset: Database rights may create some 
constraints for scientific research 
 Threat to Asset: Database rights 
 Risk Likelihood: Possible 
 Risk Impact: Major 
 Resulting Risk Level: High 
 Risk Event: Negligence: This risk takes place at steps 
number 1 and 3  (see Figure 4 above). That is, when the 
broker sends the SLA request to various Cloud providers 
and then filters the offers received. In this case the broker 
must choose the provider according to end-XVHU¶VFULWHULD 
 Resulting Risk Mitigation: Clearly define database rights 
within the SLA through the XML Description Schema and 
add a Boolean ³waiving´ system whereby the Cloud 
provider can choose to keep or waive database rights based 
on end-users input.  
 
      Figure 6: Example of Legal Category 
 
 
Finally, when the researchers and doctors use a Cloud computing service to store and 
process the data of patients, they are particularly concerned about the confidentiality and 
integrity of such data. These two aspects are integral parts of the security infrastructure, but 
also, in particular, the availability of such data during a time of crisis. While confidentiality 
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refers to the property of data or information not being made available or disclosed to 
unauthorized persons,132 integrity means that the information must be accurate, not allowing 
data to be modified.133 Availability, on the other hand, is concerned with ensuring that data 
and services are accessible where and when it is needed with the proviso that is consistent 
with the SLA legal framework.134  
In the event of any disaster (e.g. earthquake, floods, etc.), the risk assessment framework 
through the CBS may help to fix the situation immediately and fill the gap in emergency 
situations. According to the ISO 27001, availability is: ³DFKDUDFWHULVWLFWKDWDSSOLHVWRDVVHWV
An asset is available if it is accessible and usable when needed by an authorized entity. In the 
context of this standard, assets include things like information, systems, facilities, networks, 
DQGFRPSXWHUV´135 )URPDOHJDOSHUVSHFWLYH³DYDLODELOLW\´LVVWURQJO\UHODWHGWR³RZQHUVKLS´
rights of data as this also refers to the legal wherewithal to control and make good use of data. 
The threat analysis suggests that the risk ratings belonging to availability are classified as 
medium in comparison to confidentiality (high) and integrity (low). This is because the end-
users (or patients in this case) are more concerned with their privacy. Therefore, 
confidentiality has a VWURQJHU HIIHFW RQ WUXVW DQG WKH SURYLGHU¶V UHSXWDWLRQ ,QWHJULW\ can be 
caused by accidental software and user errors, equipment failure and deliberate alteration of 
data by third parties. It is relatively low because the impact is much lower in comparison to 
the availability of data. Loss of availability is classified as medium since end-users and 
enterprises are better off using Cloud computing provider resources rather than deploying 
their own infrastructure taking into account the cost benefits.136 
 
 
 Risk Category: Technical/General 
 Asset Identified: Availability of Data and Databases 
 Vulnerability of Asset: Lack of maintenance 
 Threat to Asset: Database server failure 
 Risk Likelihood: Rare 
 Risk Impact: Moderate 
 Resulting Risk Level: Product of risk likelihood and risk 
impact = Low 
 Risk Event: Unavailability of data due to server failure: 
This risk takes place at step number 5 (see Figure 4 above) 
during service operation. That is, when the Cloud provider 
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is running the service and unexpectedly there is a server 
failure e.g. one or more VMs stop running. 
 Resulting Risk Mitigation: Fault-tolerance solutions 
provision 
 
 
Figure 7: Example of Technical/General Category 
 
 Risk Category: Technical/General 
 Asset Identified: Availability of data and databases 
 Vulnerability of Asset: Data center infrastructure (servers) 
 Threat to Asset: Force majeure (such as floods, earthquakes, 
etc.) 
 Risk Likelihood: Rare 
 Risk Impact: Major 
 Resulting Risk Level: Product of risk likelihood and risk 
impact = Medium 
 Risk Event: Unavailability of data due to server failure: 
This risk takes place at step number 5 (see Figure 4 above) 
during service operation. That is, when the Cloud provider 
is running the service and unexpectedly there is an event of 
force majeure. 
 Resulting Risk Mitigation: Redundancy and use of back-up 
servers located in different places (cities): Data should be 
constantly replicated with databases and back-up solutions 
during the whole Cloud computing service life cycle. 
 
      Figure 8: Example of Technical/General Category 
 
. 
10 Conclusion 
 
As with any intellectual property matter, the European Database Directive was designed to 
counterbalance two opposite forces. Along the same lines, it is true that database protection is 
an instrument that may foster innovation and investment within the database industry. On the 
opposing end, stringent laws such as database rights may also create potential conflicts with 
regulations that are not compatible,137  specially if we consider the global and ubiquitous 
nature of the Cloud. In addition, the Big Data movement raises the question of ³RZQHUVKLS´
rights in the new data generated. This issue is far from being clear as this concept glosses over 
many aspects that ought to be clearly specified during SLA negotiation.  
Increasing interest in the use of SLAs to govern interactions in Cloud computing 
transactions has gained momentum. While such agreements are a vital component to ensure a 
successful relationship between end-users and Cloud providers, they are limited in scope and 
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coverage. Such limitations may give rise to considerable exposure of risks not only for end-
users, but also for service providers. Therefore, a risk assessment component has been fully 
implemented in the OPTIMIS software toolkit, which aligns with the SLA framework in the 
context of grid and Cloud resource brokers. This model provides a solution as to how to 
express these requirements on a technical level in the SLAs and the data management system. 
It has also been equipped with a monitoring tool as well as the requirements of an inherent 
legal risk inventory, which provides an additional layer of legal protection. This enables very 
fine-grained and continuous control over the data and databases thus allowing the 
identification of the sort of actions that are needed to reduce and mitigate such risks. 
Crucially, this new framework attempts, not only to raise collective awareness of the risks 
entailed in a neglected area of research, but also at increasing confidence levels, prompting 
the involved parties to trust each other to a greater extent than is currently the case. 
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